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Studies about innovation find evidence of a positive relation-
ship between technological advancement and firm performance,
in particular when the innovative effort is continuous. This pa-
per aims to further the analysis on the duration of R&D invest-
ment at the firm level. The contribution of this study is threefold:
first, we extend Máñez et al. [2014], Triguero et al. [2014] analy-
sis for Spain to the Italian case: we use a panel of manufacturing
and service companies, thus enlarging the view of R&D duration
within the European countries. Secondly, from a methodological
point of view, we employ both discrete- and continuous-time du-
ration models, in order to test the Proportional Hazards (PH)
assumption, i.e. the assumption that the hazard rate is equiv-
alent over time across groups. Last, but not least, we assess
whether a firm’s likelihood of continuing investment in R&D
depends on the market power of companies. We test alternative
measures for market power: the classical price-cost margin and
a new proxy for the firm demand elasticity, obtained from a spe-
cific survey question. Results are in line with the hypothesis that
R&D presents considerable temporal spill overs and strong per-
sistence, even once unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for.
Also, we argue that the appropriate proxy for market power is
the firm demand elasticity, and we find support for the Schum-
peterian hypothesis.
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1 introduction
Given the result that innovation is a key factor for the enhancement of firms’
performance, what recently seems to matter is the R&D input persistence,
which is converted into persistence of innovative output and growth of com-
panies (Peters [2006]). This paper aims to further the discussion about what
determines the persistency of R&D investment at the firm level, taking into
particular consideration the role of market power of the companies.
The result of a positive relationship between firms’ innovation and per-
formance is robust to different measures of innovation and different prox-
ies for economic performance. Innovation is positively associated with firm
growth (Audretsch [1995]) and this result is confirmed by Doms et al. [1995],
who use the number of advanced technologies employed by the firm as a
measure for innovation.1
Despite the difficulties embodied in a production-function framework
[Bronzini and Piselli, 2006], innovation is found to be positively associated
with productivity, both at the aggregated level [Bronzini and Piselli, 2006,
Geroski, 1989] and at the firm level [Parisi et al., 2006]. A more comprehen-
sive approach is carried on by Crépon et al. [1998], who move from some
“stylised facts” and build an empirical model that encompasses the whole in-
novation process: the decision to undertake research activity, the magnitude
of such effort, the output of the innovative process and the impact on firm’s
productivity. Innovative output is positively affected by R&D intensity and,
in turn, positively affects productivity. This approach has been widely im-
plemented by other authors [Mairesse and Robin, 2009, Masso and Vahter,
2008, Polder et al., 2009, Van Leeuwen and Klomp, 2006].
Cefis and Ciccarelli [2005] exploit a Bayesian approach to find that the dif-
ference in profitability between innovators (defined as firms that apply for
a patent) and non-innovators is greater when comparison is made between
persistent innovators and persistent non-innovators. Furthermore, they find
long-run persistence in profit differentials: innovators tend to converge to a
higher long-run equilibrium with respect to non-innovators. Similar results
are obtained by Bartoloni and Baussola [2009].
Banbury and Mitchell [1995] find that firms that are late in introducing
innovations have a higher rate of exit from the market. This result is sup-
ported by the work of Cefis and Marsili [2004], who use a parametric dura-
tion model and find a positive relationship between product (process) inno-
vation and firm survival.
What we want to shed light on, hence, are the determinants of R&D per-
sistence, i.e. why some firms are continuously engaged in innovation while
others show intermittent investment behavior. In order to do so, we ex-
ploit a duration model approach, following the work of Máñez et al. [2014],
Triguero et al. [2014], and including a large set of explanatory variables.
Two determinants are particularly taken into consideration, the innovation
persistence and the market power of companies.
1 This measure of innovation does not distinguish between technologies developed or just em-
ployed by the firm. Nonetheless, as shown in [Banbury and Mitchell, 1995], many firms are able
to survive in the market by keeping up with the technological forefront of the industry, either
by being the first to market with incremental innovation or by quickly adopting competitors’
products that are successful.
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Innovation Persistence
A stream of recent literature has tried to determine whether innovation per-
sistence is “true” or spurious [Hecker and Ganter, 2014]. Spurious persis-
tence refers to the possibility that innovation is caused by time-invariant
unobserved firm characteristics that are exogenous to the sequence of inno-
vative events, but determine its initial conditions (“past dependence” [An-
tonelli et al., 2012b]). Models can incorporate some correction accounting
for spurious persistence, which is found to explain a significant part of the
innovation process.2
Conversely, true persistence (“state dependence”) results from causal ef-
fects of past activities on current innovation behaviour. In other words, it
is the effect of intertemporal spill overs between subsequent innovation ac-
tivities. Among the mechanisms that may explain state dependence, three
major accounts can be told apart: first, technological knowledge is an eco-
nomic good characterised by cumulability and non-exhaustibility, and repre-
sents at the same time an input and an output of the knowledge-generating
process [Antonelli et al., 2012b]. Hence, firms that have generated new tech-
nological knowledge can rely upon such output to generate new, additional
knowledge at a lower cost. Dynamic increasing returns are likely to shape
innovative activities: the larger the cumulated size of innovation, the larger
is the positive effect on costs (“learning-to-learn” and “learning-by-doing”
effects).
A second stream, as reported in Duguet and Monjon [2004], holds that
firms need to successfully profit from their innovation in order to be able
to innovate again. According to this view, commercial success increases
the probability of future innovation because it allows for the reallocation
of profits to new research projects (“success-breads-success” effect). Firms
that successfully innovate are hence more likely to follow on innovations
because of higher permanent market power [Le Bas and Scellato, 2014].
Thirdly, it is worth mentioning the “sunk-costs” effect theory, according
to which innovative activities are characterised by high set up costs for re-
search facilities and the training of personnel, and by long-term commit-
ments in terms of investment. Once research has started, the opportunity
cost of interrupting it is quite high. This implies that research and develop-
ment activities generate high entry and exit barriers as well [Antonelli et al.,
2012a].
As pointed out in [Antonelli et al., 2012a,b, Duguet and Monjon, 2004,
Le Bas and Scellato, 2014, Peters, 2006], all these arguments can be seen
as complementary, rather than mutually exclusive, in explaining innovation
persistence.
Innovation and Market Power
The “success-breads-success” theory is tested for by introducing market
power into our set of explanatory variables. Theoretical models and em-
pirical studies about the effects of market power on innovative activity are
generally ambiguous.
Schumpeter, and the literature that sprung from his work, argues that
firms with greater market power have a higher incentive to innovate because
they can better appropriate the returns of their R&D investment: intense
2 See, among others, [Antonelli et al., 2012a, Hecker and Ganter, 2014, Lhuillery, 2014, Peters,
2006, Triguero and Córcoles, 2013, Woerter, 2014].
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market competition would imply lower post-entry rents [Hall, 2011], while
low competitive pressure would reduce the risks associated with an inno-
vative race. In fact, were the race lost, a firm would still enjoy oligopolistic
profits.
On the other hand, many authors support Arrow’s thesis, that competi-
tion positively affects the innovative effort, since a firm that successfully
introduces a new product in the market could then become monopolist
(“escape-competition effect”, [Coscollá-Girona et al., 2011]). Conversely,
firms that already enjoy market power do not need to innovate to stay in
business. Moreover, a monopolist that innovates basically replaces itself as
the monopolist in the market. This is the so called “replacement effect" put
forward in [Arrow, 1962] as opposed to the “competitive effect" underlying
the Schumpeterian hypothesis ([Schumpeter, 1943]). An exhaustive account
of the related theoretical debate is e.g. in [Tirole, 1988], pp. 390-396. The
frontier of the empirical research in this field is in [Le Bas and Scellato,
2014].
Another stream of literature (see [Geroski, 1989, Gort and Klepper, 1982])
argues its case that the problem may be more complicated. There is evi-
dence that industries and markets evolve through different phases, and that
each phase exhibits different characteristics.3 For instance, new markets
show high entry and exit rates, often related to innovation races [Geroski,
1989], while consolidated markets where entry (exit) rates are near zero may
be characterised by incremental innovations developed by incumbents [Ban-
bury and Mitchell, 1995, Gort and Klepper, 1982]. There is also evidence of
distinct incentives to product vs. process innovation with respect to market
power Coscollá-Girona et al. [2011], Hall [2011].
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the
sample, defines the variables of interest and outlines the empirical specifica-
tion of the implemented models. Section 3 reports the results and discusses
their interpretation. Section 4 highlights some limitations of this study and
outlines a number of suggestions for further research.
2 the empirical framework
2.1 The Working Sample
Our data are obtained by merging the Survey on Industrial and Service
Firms and the Company Accounts Data Service (CADS).4 All variables were
drawn from the Survey, with the exception of revenues due to export and
price-cost margins, that were collected from the CADS. The period of in-
terest is 2003–2012, and contains 39,605 observations for 8,370 firms, with
an average of 4 consecutive years available. Specifications that include the
variables drawn from the CADS are limited to the period 2003–2010.
Due to the nature of the study, only firms that have reported positive
R&D investments in at least one year are considered. The working sample
consists of 3,138 firms, and has been cleaned in the usual way.5
3 Audretsch [1991, 1995], for instance, introduces the definition of two different technological
regimes, “entrepreneurial” vs. “routinised”.
4 For a detailed description of the samples, see [Banca d’Italia, 2013] and http://www.
centraledeibilanci.it/.
5 Dropped outliers do not influence the distributional properties of the sample, and exclude firms
whose R&D investment > 0.5 of sales and whose demand elasticity = 0 (see Section 2.3.1).
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Table 7 of the Appendix A shows that the working sample is still represen-
tative of firms’ characteristics as they were distributed in the total sample.
Some discrepancies can be found in characteristics positively (negatively)
correlated with firms’ R&D investment which are over- (under-) represented
in the working sample. This will be controlled for in the models.
2.2 Measuring Duration
As we are focusing on innovation persistence, the variable of interest is the
duration of firm’s innovative effort, or its “innovative spell”, as in Máñez
et al. [2014], Triguero et al. [2014]. Such spell is calculated for each firm
in our sample as the number of years it reports positive R&D investment.
Our dependent variable is then represented by the probability that a firm
interrupts R&D investment in the year t, given that it has invested in the
period (t− k; t− 1).
A distinguishing feature of duration data is that some observations may
be right-censored: some spells may be incomplete and their true length
unknown (this happens, for instance, when we register firms innovating in
the last observed year, 2012, and we do not know whether they did the same
in 2013 or not). Let T? be a random variable measuring the firm’s innovative
spell length, and let c be the censoring time (i.e. the time beyond which we
do not observe the firm’s behaviour), measured from the time origin of the
spell. Then, the random variable that will be observed is T = min(T?, c).
An indicator variable d is also observed, and it is equal to 1 if T = T?, 0 if
T = c.6
Suppose the random variable T has continuous probability distribution
f(t), where t is realisation of T . The cumulative probability is
F(t) =
∫t
0
f(s)ds = Pr(T 6 t). (1)
The survival function describes the probability that the innovative spell is at
least of length t:
S(t) = 1− F(t) = Pr(T > t). (2)
The probability that a spell that has lasted until time t will end in the next
short time interval (∆t) is given by the hazard function
λ(t) = lim
∆t→0
Pr(t 6 T 6 t+∆t|T > t)
∆t
= lim
∆t→0
F(t+∆t) − F(t)
∆tS(t)
=
=
f(t)
S(t)
(3)
where f(t) = dF(t)/dt is the density function. Roughly speaking, λ(t) is
the rate at which spells will be completed at duration t, given that they last
until t [Greene, 2005].
Table 1 reports the functions of survival and hazard, estimated by the
Kaplan-Meyer and the Nelson-Aalen estimators respectively. The survival
function is less-than-proportionally decreasing in time: at the end of the
considered period, only about 23% of firms are still spending in R&D, but
most of exits take place at the very beginning, with 50% of firms ceasing
6 It is crucial to assume that firms whose spells are censored at time c are representative of firms
whose spell length is T 6 c. Thus, c must be independent of T?, having taken account of
other factors (explanatory variables) [Kiefer, 1988].
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investment within the first 3 years. On average, firms invest for more than
3 consecutive years (3.06 years).7
2.2.1 Dealing with Left-Censoring
Left censoring occurs when we do not observe the starting date of the in-
novative spell (e.g. this concerns the spells of firms reporting positive R&D
investment in the first year, 2003, since we do not have data about innova-
tion prior to 2003 and are therefore unable to determine when innovation
began).8
As pointed out in [Iceland, 1997], omitting left-censored cases could lead
to serious selection bias since one might exclude from the analysis firms that
present the longest innovative spells. In fact, while firms that invest in R&D
discontinuously (i.e. have several short spells) may be expected to re-enter
the data set, firms that continuously engage in innovative activity would be
ignored, leading to a downward bias in estimation of the survival function.
Bias is increasing in the share of left-censored spells and in the correlation
between explanatory variables and the error term.9
Several methods can mitigate the problem, but to our knowledge there is
no solution.10 Stevens [1995] suggests, as implemented in [Triguero et al.,
2014], to include left-censored spells in the analysis and add a dummy
variable indicating whether the observed spell is left-censored or not. For
tractability reasons we will follow this approach, that allows the retaining
of all available information, although it does not represent a solution to bias
and selectivity.
2.3 Explanatory Variables
Explanatory variables are:
• The logarithm of innovative stock (lnRD), contemporary and lagged
values;11
• The number of spells in which the firm has continuously invested in
R&D (Spell Number);
• The elapsed duration of each spell (Time);
7 These estimators are more accurate for short spells, since inference about very long durations
is based on fewer observations [Kiefer, 1988].
8 Innovative spells are likely to be left-truncated too, since firms might have experienced inno-
vative spells that ended before 2003. Hence, the analysis is conditional upon firm survival up
to 2003, and firm engaging in R&D investment in 2003 or later (delayed-entry). Fortunately,
as shown by Bhattacharjee et al. [2002], Jenkins [2005], delayed-entry does not jeopardise esti-
mation as long as the correct entry time is considered (which is, the first year a firm reports
positive R&D investment, i.e. it becomes at risk of discontinuing innovative activity).
9 Carter and Signorino [2013] report that the bias is severe if 10% or more observations are
left-censored. It is hence a serious issue for our sample, in which over 50% of spells are left-
censored.
10 For a review, see the discussion on StataList: http://www.stata.com/statalist/archive/
2009-09/msg00081.html, and [Carter and Signorino, 2013, Iceland, 1997, Stevens, 1995].
11 This stock measure is computed by the means of the permanent inventory method: given the
flow measure IR&Dt ,
RDt = I
R&D
t +(1− δ)RDt−1. with δ representing the depreciation rate.
The literature usually finds a high depreciation rate for knowledge (over 30%) [Bublitz and
Ettredge, 1989, Hirschey, 1982]. This is because innovation has an incremental nature and
also because knowledge tends to leak to competitors, due to both expired patent rights and
operations of reverse engineering [Griliches, 1998]. A discussion on R&D for the Italian case is
in [Bontempi and Mairesse, 2015].
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Table 1: Spell Description; Survival and Hazard Functions.
All Spells No left-censoring†
Survival Hazard Survival Hazard
1 0.7303 0.0079 0.7035 0.0115
2 0.5910 0.0097 0.5598 0.0141
3 0.5037 0.0104 0.4575 0.0148
4 0.4207 0.0106 0.3692 0.0152
5 0.3558 0.0106 0.3106 0.0152
6 0.3031 0.0103 0.2757 0.0151
7 0.2645 0.0100 0.2498 0.0152
8 0.2398 0.0098 0.2299 0.0157
9‡ 0.2219 0.0097 0.2299 0.0157
10‡ 0.2219 0.0097 — —
Num. of Spells 3,939 1,910
Avg. Num. of Spells by Firm 1.2557 1.220
Avg. Spell Duration 3.0567 2.5073
Num. of Firms 3,137 1,565
Time at Risk 9,589 3,924
(†) The elimination of left-truncated records from the data set means the dismissal of all spells observed in
2003.
(‡) At the end of 2012 we observe zero failures (i.e. interruption of R&D investment). Hence, estimates of
survival and hazard in year 10 (9) are equal to those in year 9 (8).
• A dummy equal to 1 if the spell is left-censored (Left Cens., see previ-
ous Section 2.2.1);
• Planned investments in physical and software capital over sales (IM
and IS, respectively);
• The difference between planned physical and software investments in
t− 1, and the effective investment in t (∆IM and ∆IS, respectively);
• Cash flow net of dividends paid over sales (CF), contemporary and
lagged values;
• Short- and long-term bank debt and financial debt versus other finan-
cial institutions over sales (D), contemporary and lagged values;
• A dummy equal to 1 if the ratio of revenues from export to total rev-
enues is positive (Exp);
• A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm belongs to a High-Tech indus-
trial sector (HTech);
• Market power: we compare two measures, the price-cost margin (PCM)
and the firm-level demand elasticity (-η), discussed in the following
Section 2.3.1);
• The Bloom Index of Economic Policy Uncertainty (Bloom, [Baker et al.,
2013]);
• Control variables for firm’s age, size (log of the number of employees),
group-membership, type of ownership, geographical area (variables
ln Age, ln Size, Group, Family, Centre, South).
2.3.1 Demand Elasticity
Measuring market power is a non-trivial issue, since researchers usually are
not able to observe demand elasticity or marginal costs. Hence, the most
used proxies in the empirical industrial organisation literature are concen-
tration measures (concentration ratios, Hirshman-Herfindal indexes, market
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shares) or PCMs.12 These measures are widely used in spite of their draw-
backs. As reported in [Coscollá-Girona et al., 2011, Domowitz et al., 1986],
high degrees of concentration, or increased PCMs, are not necessarily symp-
toms of lack of competition. Boone [2000] points out that there is no simple
relationship between product market competition and market structure if
firm’s cost efficiency levels are asymmetric. For instance, enhanced competi-
tion may raise the market shares of the most efficient firms at the expense of
inefficient ones, increasing the Herfindal index (“reallocation effect”, [Boone,
2008]); or concentration may rise as the most inefficient firms exit the market
because of more intense competition (“selection effect”, [Boone, 2008]). The
latter case may also lead to an increase in the average PCM. In like manner,
if less competitive pressure leads to higher costs due to inefficiency or ab-
sence of cost-reducing innovations, the PCM will decrease [Coscollá-Girona
et al., 2011]. Furthermore, as pointed out by Domowitz et al. [1986], PCMs
are sensitive to demand fluctuations.
In this paper we first follow the standard way of measuring market power
as the price-cost margin, defined by (see [Bontempi et al., 2010, Domowitz
et al., 1986]:
PCM =
Sales+∆Inventories− Payroll−Materials
Sales
.
Secondly, an important contribution of this study is the use of an alter-
native measure of market power, given by the implied demand elasticity,
obtained from qualitative data. In the 1996 and 2007 surveys firms were
asked the following question:
Consider the following hypothetical experiment: suppose your
firm raises today the price of the goods produced by 10 percent.
What would be the percent change in the value of sales, assum-
ing that your firm’s competitors leave their prices unchanged,
and holding everything else constant?13
Such a question directly refers to the firm price elasticity of demand; follow-
ing Guiso et al. [2006], let z ∈ (−100, 100] be the answer to the question, and
the elasticity is computed as:
−η =
z
100
− 1. (4)
The mean value is -1.38, and the great majority of firms show an implied
elasticity greater than 1 in absolute value. Descriptive statistics given in
Table 2 are consistent with some firms having market power.
Among surveyed firms, only 179 responded to both the questionnaires in
which the question was submitted. Little difference can be found in their
answers, and it is probably due to rounding figures rather than significant
changes in the elasticity. In fact, while the overall distribution is quite similar
across years, the frequency of round figures rises in 2007. Hence, the mean
value of the implied elasticity has been used for such firms, as this operation
12 For innovation studies that employ concentration measures see, among others, [Acs and Au-
dretsch, 1988, Audretsch, 1991, Banbury and Mitchell, 1995, Blundell et al., 1999, Cefis and
Ciccarelli, 2005, Duguet and Monjon, 2004, Geroski et al., 2007, Lhuillery, 2014, López-García
and Puente, 2006, Máñez et al., 2014]; for studies that employ the PCM see [Aghion et al., 2002,
Antonelli et al., 2012b, Audretsch, 1995, Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2006]; Woerter [2014] uses the
number of each firm’s principal competitors.
13 [Banca d’Italia, 2008].
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does not change the statistical properties of the distribution, as shown in
Table 2.
Table 2: Implied Elasticity.
Variable Mean Min 25th P. 50th P. 75th P. Max Std. Dev. Skew. Kurt.
−η -1.38 -2.00 -1.60 -1.30 -1.10 -0.10 0.36 -0.40 2.34
Avg. −η -1.38 -2.00 -1.60 -1.30 -1.10 -0.10 0.35 -0.44 2.44
The fact that for some firms |η| < 1 means that the Lerner index is not
constrained to 1. This is in contrast with the hypothesis of firms maximising
their profits, since some of them seem to be operating in the inelastic portion
of the demand curve. In other words, if increasing their selling prices would
grant an increase in sales, why would they not do so? Quite simply, this
“irrational” behaviour can be explained by the fact that firms are not in their
long-run equilibrium. Furthermore, a closer look at the 179 firms for which
z is observed in two points in time confirms this explanation: 27 (15%) out
of 179 firms operate in the unelastic portion of the demand curve in either
1996 or 2007, 10 move from the unelastic to the elastic portion, 17 the other
way around. All other firms register |η| > 1 in both periods.
Table 3 reports some descriptive statistics about the relationship between
the implied demand elasticity, the PCM, firm’s age, and firm’s size.
Table 3: R&D, PCM and Size across Elasticity Classes.
−η Class I
R&D
t PCM Size
Mean 50th P. N Mean 50 P. N Mean 50 P. N
Highly El. 0.006 0.000 4,182 0.078 0.080 4,601 629 175 8,749
Elastic 0.007 0.000 5,080 0.092 0.088 6,571 514 190 12,060
Unitarily El. 0.014 0.000 407 0.066 0.092 379 397 110 855
Inelastic 0.007 0.000 1,277 0.109 0.103 969 625 215 2,192
Total 0.007 0.000 10,946 0.087 0.086 12,520 563 183 23,856
Note: Computed elasticity has been split into the following categories: (1) Highly elastic if |η| > 1.5, (2)
Elastic if 1.5 > |η| > 1, (3) Unitarily elastic if |η| = 1, (4) Inelastic if |η| < 1.
2.4 Empirical Specification
2.4.1 The Cox Model
As in Máñez et al. [2014], we use the semi-parametric Cox model as starting
point for our analysis, since it is quite flexible and does not require any
assumption about the functional form of the hazard.
Each i-th firm faces a hazard function which is common to all firms (the
“baseline” hazard, λ0) and is then modified by the set of explanatory vari-
ables x′i. The relationship between the individual risk and the vector x
′
i
depends upon the estimated coefficient vector β. The Cox model assumes
the individual risk to be equal to the product of the “baseline” risk and the
function φ(x′i,β) = exp(x
′β):
λi(t) = λ0(t)φ(x
′
iβ) = λ0(t) exp(x
′
iβ). (5)
In other words, the shape of the hazard function is the same for all firms,
and variations in x′i just shift the function. This allows for a direct interpre-
tation of the estimated coefficients, since
β =
∂ lnφ(x,β)
∂x
(6)
9
represents the constant proportional effect of an increase in the relative vari-
able on the conditional probability of exiting the innovative state. This ap-
proach provides estimation of β without requiring estimation of λ0.
The Cox model suffers from four potential drawbacks:
1. It implies a continuous time specification (hence it assumes no ties).
If ties rarely occur, it is possible to account for them with the Efron
method.14 When ties are frequent, there is no way to avoid asymptotic
bias in both the estimated coefficients and the correspondent covari-
ance matrix [Hess and Persson, 2010];
2. Unobserved heterogeneity (i.e. spurious persistence) cannot be in-
cluded;
3. It is not possible to obtain any information about the shape of the
hazard function λ0, which is actually important in order to ascertain
if there is negative (positive) duration dependence. A distribution
the hazard function of which slopes downward (upward) is said to
have negative (positive) duration dependence Kiefer [1988], Lancaster
[1979], Verbeek [2004].
4. The Cox model in Equation (5) assumes Proportional Hazards (PH).
This means that the effect of any explanatory variable on the hazard is
assumed to be constant over duration time. It is straightforward that,
should the PH assumption fail, estimated covariate effects would be bi-
ased. The PH assumption may fail to hold for two reasons: (1) because
the effect of explanatory variables is intrinsically non-proportional; (2)
because unobserved individual heterogeneity is not accounted for and
makes the effect depend on duration time, even if the underlying pro-
cess is of the proportional hazards form [Brenton et al., 2009]. Fol-
lowing Hess and Persson [2010], we have performed a test based on
the Schoenfeld residuals. Results are reported in Table 4, and strongly
reject the PH assumption.
2.4.2 The Cloglog Model
The Cloglog model assumes a complementary log-logistic form for the haz-
ard, and overcomes many limitations that affect the Cox model. In fact, as
well as giving a discrete time representation of an underlying continuous
time proportional hazards model, it also controls for unobserved hetero-
geneity and gives information about the duration dependence of the hazard.
Hazard and survival functions are given by:
λ(t) =
λp(λt)p−1
1+ (λt)p
; (7)
S(t) =
1
1+ (λt)p
; (8)
where the log of duration, ln t, has a logistic distribution with mean − ln λ
and variance pi2/(3p3), (λ and p are unknown parameters to be estimated).
When p 6 1, the hazard rate is monotonically decreasing to zero as t in-
creases. If p > 1, the hazard increases at first and then decreases to zero
[Wooldridge, 2002].
14 For details, see StataCorp. [2013].
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Table 4: Test of Proportional Hazard Assumptions for the Cox Model.
Variables
Cox Models, as in Table 8
P-value for the Test of Schoenfeld Residuals.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
lnRDt (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.4018) (0.0000) (0.0000)
lnRDt−1 (0.0000) (0.0000)
Spell Number (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Time (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Left Cens. (0.0000) (0.0005) (0.9623) (0.0163) (0.9314) (0.0123) (0.8744)
IMt (0.1154) (0.5954) (0.6278) (0.3637)
∆IM (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
ISt (0.0069) (0.0235) (0.1616) (0.3628)
∆IS (0.1989) (0.8150) (0.0000) (0.0023)
CFt (0.6589) (0.0542) (0.8158) (0.4547) (0.0112)
CFt−1 (0.0924) (0.0004)
Dt (0.2104) (0.0001) (0.1560) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Dt−1 (0.3074) (0.1133)
Exp (0.0074) (0.0105) (0.2255) (0.0082) (0.0958) (0.0087) (0.0127)
HTech (0.7329) (0.1318) (0.9844) (0.2097) (0.4111) (0.1333) (0.1347)
−η (0.6758) (0.8088) (0.5136) (0.9077) (0.9945) (0.8186)
PCM (0.3043)
Bloom 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
ln Age (0.5822) (0.4899) (0.3338) (0.8009) (0.4375) (0.9742) (0.2949)
ln Size (0.9349) (0.2604) (0.6935) (0.0224) (0.3228) (0.0053) (0.0095)
Group (0.9060) (0.1607) (0.3379) (0.7461) (0.3384) (0.8780) (0.8319)
Family (0.0000) (0.0113) (0.0058) (0.0414) (0.0015) (0.0945) (0.0022)
Centre (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0158) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
South (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Global Test (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
The log-likelihood is
logL =
n∑
i=1
di ln
(
λit
1− λit
)
+
n∑
i=1
t∑
k=1
ln(1− λik); (9)
where di = 1 if the interval is right-censored and 0 otherwise. Máñez et al.
[2014] report that Equation (9) can be rewritten as the log-likelihood func-
tion of a binary dependent variable yik = 1 if spell i ends in year k, and 0
otherwise:
logL =
n∑
i=1
t∑
k=1
[
yik ln λik + (1− yik) ln(1− λik)
]
; (10)
where λ is
λt(x
′
itβ) = 1− exp
[
− exp(β0 + x′itβ+ γt)
]
; (11)
where xit are time-varying covariates (constant within the interval), and
γ is a polynomial in time that allows for a flexible definition of duration
dependence. In the present work, the highest order polynomial that resulted
significant was the first.
As discussed in Section 1, many studies highlight the importance of un-
observed heterogeneity (let denote it by νi) in explaining the persistence
of innovation. If unobserved heterogeneity is indeed important, ignoring it
will lead to over- (under-) estimation of the degree of negative (positive) du-
ration dependence [Jenkins, 2005, Lancaster, 1979]. This is a selection effect:
if duration dependence is negative, observation with high values of ν will
fail faster, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, the proportionate effect βk of a given
regressor xk on the hazard rate will no longer be constant and independent
of survival time, and βk will be downward-biased [Lancaster, 1979].
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Heterogeneity enters the underlying continuous hazard function multi-
plicatively:
λ(t, xit) = λ0(t) exp(β0 + x′itβ)νi, (12)
hence, the Cloglog model becomes:
λt(xit) = 1− exp[− exp(β0 + x′itβ+ γt + ui)], (13)
where ui ≡ lnνi and νi is a random variable taking on positive values,
with mean normalised to one and finite variance σ2. It is crucial to assume
that νi is distributed independently of xit and t. This variable can be inter-
preted as the impact of omitted (unobserved) variables, or of measurement
errors in recorded regressors or recorded survival times [Jenkins, 2005]. Es-
timation of this model requires an expression for the density function that
does not condition upon the unobserved effects. It is hence convenient to
specify a distribution for ν in order to “integrate out” the unobserved effect
(i.e. one works with the function λ(t, x′|β,σ2) rather than λ(t, x′|β,ν)). For
tractability reasons, the choice of distribution is limited to those that provide
a closed form expression for the frailty hazard function.
The Stata command xtcloglog allows for the estimation of the model as-
suming the heterogeneity νi is normally distributed; the program pgmhaz8
has been used for Gamma-distributed frailty.
The Cloglog framework also allows for the incorporation of unobserved
heterogeneity non-parametrically by assuming that there are several types
of firm spell (“mass points”). This implies that each spell has probabilities
associated with the different mass point, allowing for different intercepts of
the hazard function. For a model with nmass points, the hazard in Equation
(13) becomes:
λt,m(xit) = 1− exp[− exp(mn +β0 + x′it + γt)]. (14)
Normalising the first mass point to zero, the intercept for type-1 firm is
β0, that for type-2 firm is β0 +m2 and so on. Regressions that incorporate
non-parametric frailty were run with the Stata program hshaz.
In order to verify the PH assumption in the Cloglog model, we follow
Hess and Persson [2010], allowing the explanatory variables to vary over
time in the Cloglog model with unobserved heterogeneity. Testing the PH
assumption reduces here to the verification of the hypothesis ξk = 0,∀k =
1, . . . ,K, where ξk is the coefficient of the interaction term (xk · t). Results for
this test are provided in Table 5. The PH assumption holds throughout all
specifications, hence the Cloglog model is appropriate for the phenomenon
description.
2.4.3 The Probit Model
Discrete-time survival analysis often employs Logit models as an alterna-
tive to semi-parametrical approaches as the Cloglog, in order to relax the
PH assumption. However, since the considered event (interruption of in-
novative effort) occurs quite frequently, and many spells last longer than 1
year, the Logit assumption of event independence would be invalid, leading
to biased estimates [Banbury and Mitchell, 1995]. Hence, we prefer to use
a dynamic random-effects Probit model, following [Antonelli et al., 2012a,
Hecker and Ganter, 2014, Lhuillery, 2014, Peters, 2006, Triguero and Cór-
coles, 2013, Triguero et al., 2014].
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Table 5: Test of Proportional Hazard Assumptions for the Cloglog model.
Variables
Cloglog models, as in Table 9
P-value for the Hypothesis ξk = 0.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
lnRDt (0.5327) (0.4102) (0.9336) (0.3598) (0.7211)
lnRDt−1 (0.0355) (0.0399)
Spell Number (0.8247) (0.6805) (0.7939) (0.5110) (0.6904) (0.3155) (0.3645)
IM (0.1871) (0.3145) (0.4566)
∆IM (0.6744) (0.5601) (0.6878) (0.7204)
IS (0.5155) (0.7277) (0.7484)
∆IS (0.8338) (0.8177) (0.1130) (0.3997)
CFt (0.8126) (0.7012) (0.8828) (0.8663) (0.9877)
CFt−1 (0.1475) (0.1848)
Dt (0.0517) (0.4906) (0.5566) (0.6681) (0.6908)
Dt−1 (0.0686) (0.1112)
−η (0.3011) (0.3327) (0.3860) (0.4118) (0.5165) (0.5204)
PCM (0.8250)
Bloom (0.2237) (0.4221) (0.1382)
ln Size (0.6420) (0.1894) (0.1023) (0.6119) (0.3894) (0.9500) (0.8544)
ln Age (0.6566) (0.6835) (0.8342) (0.4868) (0.5283) (0.6216) (0.6811)
Global Test (0.6776) (0.6672) (0.7650) (0.9479) (0.9568) (0.1385) (0.1638)
Hess and Persson [2010] report that this test is robust to the assumed distribution of heterogeneity (here we
use normally-distributed frailty).
The expressions in the likelihood function are given by
f(yit|xit,αi,β) = Φ
(
x′itβ+αi√
1− σ2α
)
if yit = 1,
= 1−Φ
(
x′itβ+αi√
1− σ2α
)
if yit = 0, (15)
where Φ denotes the cumulative density function of the standard normal
distribution. Unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to be normally dis-
tributed (Stata command xtprobit).
3 results
Estimation results are shown in Table 6. Three specifications are reported
for each model: columns (1) contain the “traditional” approach that uses the
PCM to proxy for market power; columns (3), (7) use the implied elasticity
−η. Furthermore, columns (7) use the explanatory variables’ lags in order to
control for simultaneity problems [Coscollá-Girona et al., 2011]. We consider
column (7) in the Cloglog framework with “mass points” as the most reliable
empirical specification for our data, the other estimates being reported as
robustness checks. Our general results are discussed in what follows.
cumulativeness of r&d. The (true) persistence of the innovation pro-
cess is accounted for by the logarithm of the R&D stock and by the variables
Spell Number, Time. This set of variables captures the phenomena of cumula-
tiveness, irreversibility and increasing returns of the innovative investment,
learning-by-doing and learning-to-learn effects. Overall, there is strong evi-
dence of persistence in R&D investment: the coefficient for the accumulated
knowledge stock is negative and significant, also when its lagged value is
used.15 The coefficient of Time is also negative (although sometimes non-
significant), suggesting that the longer a firm has continuously invested in
15 In columns (1d), (7d) coefficients are non-significant, but p-values are close to 10%.
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R&D, the more likely it is that it will keep investing (negative duration de-
pendence). This is coherent with our expectations, and confirms the results
of Acs et al. [2008], Hecker and Ganter [2014], Máñez et al. [2014], Triguero
et al. [2014], who find significant temporal spill overs of R&D. As for the
number of previous spells, the coefficient is never significant (and negative).
Given the short time-window of the analysis, it can be inferred that firms
that have shown a discontinue attitude towards innovation, but have had
several innovative spells are less likely to interrupt investment again.
left-censoring. Left-censored spells have been included in the analysis,
and the dummy variable Left-Cens. is negatively associated with firms dis-
continuing their innovative activity, as in Máñez et al. [2014], Triguero et al.
[2014]. As discussed in Section 2.2.1, this precaution just mitigates (rather
than correct) the bias in estimation due to left-censoring. Nevertheless, the
negative and significant coefficient confirms the preliminary hypothesis that
left-censored spells are likely to be the longest. The exclusion of such spells
would have hence resulted in a severe overestimation of the hazard function.
physical and software investment. Although rarely significant, vari-
ables that take into account firms’ planned investment in physical capital
(machinery, IM) and software (IS) give some information about the rela-
tionship between different types of investment. While IM always has a
positive coefficient, hinting at some sort of substitution effect with respect
to R&D expenditures, software investment’s negative coefficient may sug-
gest a complementarity between innovative activities and the acquisition of
information technology, as found by Polder et al. [2009].
Alternatively to the planned expenditures, we have used as explanatory
variables the difference between the planned investment in t − 1 and the
effective investment in t, ∆IM,∆IS. Guiso et al. [2006] show that planned
investment in usually quite accurate, since deviating from plans is costly.
Hence, ∆IM,∆IS represent a variation in investment level due to some un-
expected cause. The physical capital variation’s coefficient is ambiguous in
sign, that of software is always negative, and both are non-significant, sug-
gesting that the likelihood of spending in R&D is relatively unaffected by
unanticipated deviations from investment plans. This is in line with the re-
sult obtained for the variable Bloom, that controls for uncertainty and will
be discussed below. Of course, there could be variations in the magnitude
of the innovative effort, which are not caught by our model’s specification.
finances. Máñez et al. [2014] find that the firm’s cash flow has a nega-
tive and significant effect on the likelihood of interrupting R&D investment,
supporting the hypothesis that firms that have internal funds available can
better sustain the expenses connected with research and development activi-
ties. Among studies that use duration models, few include a direct measure
of debt (Triguero and Córcoles [2013] use firm’s leverage, defined as exter-
nal funds over equity). We think it is quite important that the two sources
of funds were included, either from the point of view of the correct specifi-
cation of the capital structure behind the model of R&D duration (Bontempi
[2003]), either for the institutional characteristics of the country under anal-
ysis (Munari et al. [2010]). Italy’s national corporate governance is classified
as “insider-dominated” and the corporate financial system as “continental”.
Such characteristics entail lower protection of external investors (with re-
spect to “outsider-dominated” systems as the UK and the US), strong and
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stable firm-bank liaisons, and lower occurrence of changes in corporate con-
trol. Even if rarely significant, overall the negative sign of cash flow (CF)
and the positive one for debt (D) tend to signal the presence of liquidity
constraints due to agency costs and asymmetric information particularly
relevant if the R&D case (see also Bontempi [2016]).
international competition. The dummy variable Export controls for
firm’s exposure to international competition (unfortunately, data about im-
port — i.e. the penetration of international competition — were not avail-
able). The coefficient is negative and, sometimes, significant.16 The litera-
ture ([Antonelli et al., 2012b, Coscollá-Girona et al., 2011, Hecker and Gan-
ter, 2014, Máñez et al., 2014, Masso and Vahter, 2008, Peters, 2006, Triguero
and Córcoles, 2013]) finds a positive and strong relationship between export
and R&D continuity. Lööf et al. [2015] point out that the openness of busi-
ness sectors increases the likelihood that a firm will access a larger amount
of information, exploit spill overs, and thus increase its knowledge stock
(“learning-by-exporting” effect). We do not find conclusive evidence of the
sort, coefficients being negative but only rarely significant.
technological opportunities. Contrary to the findings of Coscollá-
Girona et al. [2011], Crépon et al. [1998], Duguet and Monjon [2004], Hecker
and Ganter [2014], Huang [2008], Máñez et al. [2014], Peters [2006], Triguero
and Córcoles [2013], Triguero et al. [2014], technological opportunities, prox-
ied by the dummy HTech, are non-significant, although the coefficient is
negative. This result is quite striking and may be due to the fact that Ital-
ian firms suffer from what Cannari et al. [2012] calls “innovative gap” with
respect to other Western Countries. On one hand, high-tech firms are a lit-
tle share of all firms; on the other, Italian firms are less prone to engage in
R&D, and this is true across all sectors. Additionally, high-tech firms repre-
sent less than 5% of sampled firms. For these reasons, the model might not
be able to detect a significant effect for this variable.
market power. Columns (1) include a “traditional” measure of market
power: the price-cost margin (PCM). Estimated coefficients tend to be pos-
itive and would the hypothesis according to which market power disincen-
tives innovative effort. Besides, in Section 2.3.1, we pointed out that price-
cost margin is a very noisy proxy.
Hence, in columns (3), (7), we have used our implied demand elastic-
ity measure, −η. Obtained coefficients are negative, although just slightly
significant. This would support the Schumpeterian hypothesis of a posi-
tive relationship between market power and innovation, and possibly the
“success-bread-success” effect.
uncertainty. The Bloom Index of Economic Policy Uncertainty [Baker
et al., 2013] captures uncertainty and macroeconomic effects.17 The coef-
ficient is significant and negative across all specifications, upholding the
theory of sunk costs: since investment in R&D incurs flow adjustment
cost (while stock adjustments are possible for physical capital), uncertainty
16 Alternatively, we had used the ratio of revenues from export to total revenues, and a dummy for
“big exporters” (where a big export is defined as a firm whose ratio of revenues from export
to total revenues is larger that 0.27, the 75th percentile of the ratio distribution). Estimated
coefficients are coherent with those reported.
17 All models were estimated with time-dummies as an alternative to the Bloom Index. Temporal
effects’ coefficients are jointly significant and negative.
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makes firms to be less reactive in their decision-making (“caution” effect),
strengthening the dynamic link between current and past R&D activity
[Bloom, 2006, Geroski et al., 2007].
control variables. The literature usually finds negative and significant
coefficients for firm’s age and/or size, when innovation output is used as
dependent variable (innovation or patent count, share of innovative sales).
Such variables turn out to be non-significant in most of considered specifi-
cations, apart firms’ size in models (7). Consistently with the observation of
Hall [2011], we argue that larger firms can diversify their activities and are
therefore more likely to persist in R&D investment.
As in [Angelini and Generale, 2008], we also control for group member-
ship, in order to proxy for the absence of financial constraints. Participation
in an industrial group may gain the firm access to funds through the holding
company. No significant effect is found for our data.
The effect of ownership as captured by the dummy Family, turns out to be
not relevant, or at least negative in few specifications. Consider that, on one
hand, family-owned firms should be expected to have long-term investment
horizons: owners hold significant stakes and have less agency problems (as
owners usually are also managers, and have strong ties with the company
since property is often passed down the generations), thus they have higher
incentives to ensure their firm does not under-invest in R&D. On the other
hand, family-owned firms may be more risk-adverse, as families invest a
significant amount of their own wealth in the company [Munari et al., 2010].
Moreover, Hecker and Ganter [2014] suggest that family business whose
management control and ownership pass down to the next generation are
likely to be affected by some degree of organisational inefficiency, since the
pool of potential talent of the management is reduced. Hence, data on
family ownership alone may not be sufficient to shed light on this issue.
Lastly, we used dummies for geographical area (Centre, South), holding
Northern Italy as reference, to proxy for institutional quality differences at
the regional level. Coefficient are positive, and South’s are higher and signif-
icant. As reported in Jappelli et al. [2002], judicial institutions (measured by
the length of civil trial and count of pending lawsuits) are less efficient in
Southern Italy, making contract enforcement uncertain and more costly for
firms. Court inefficiency depresses market performance and availability of
loans, which in turn reflects negatively on the propensity to engage in risky
projects (like research and development).
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Table 6: Results for the Discrete-Time Models.
Cloglog Cloglog Cloglog Probit†
Frailty: Normal Frailty: Gamma Frailty: Mass Points Frailty: Normal
(1a) (3a) (7a) (1b) (3b) (7b) (1c) (3c) (7c) (1d) (3d) (7d)
Cumulativeness
lnRDt -0.124*** -0.162*** -0.132*** -0.172*** -0.135*** -0.172*** -0.037** -0.079***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0198) (0.0011)
lnRDt−1 -0.050*** -0.080*** -0.079*** -0.017
(0.0011) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.1489)
Spell Number -0.001 -0.015 0.023 0.004 -0.106 0.083 0.012 -0.106 0.067 -0.106 -0.096 -0.015
(0.9923) (0.8965) (0.8135) (0.9684) (0.3758) (0.5750) (0.9151) (0.3766) (0.6391) (0.3580) (0.4450) (0.8483)
Time -0.112*** -0.164*** -0.129*** -0.094* -0.041 0.058 -0.083 -0.041 0.046 -0.050* -0.079*** -0.067***
(0.0011) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0797) (0.2368) (0.3525) (0.2060) (0.2594) (0.3606) (0.0977) (0.0026) (0.0012)
Left Censoring
Left Cens -0.358*** -0.398*** -0.487*** -0.387*** -0.765*** -0.716*** -0.394*** -0.766*** -0.717*** -0.267*** -0.294*** -0.319***
(0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0017) (0.000) (0.0001) (0.0049) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Investment
IM 0.089 1.096 0.125 1.407 0.137 1.411 0.225 0.346
(0.8500) (0.3099) (0.7391) (0.2177) (0.7111) (0.2170) (0.5353) (0.6961)
∆IM 0.303 0.618 0.735 0.091
(0.8238) (0.7080) (0.6440) (0.8803)
IS -25.656** -23.304* -31.461** -37.888** -33.147** -38.422** -16.407** -8.892
(0.0117) (0.0662) (0.0332) (0.0442) (0.0309) (0.0427) (0.0363) (0.2883)
∆IS -7.993 -0.546 -0.801 -13.590**
(0.3806) (0.9545) (0.9318) (0.0337)
Finances
CFt -0.809 -0.900* -2.155*** -1.083 -2.193*** -1.084 -0.202 -0.592*
(0.2524) (0.0756) (0.0056) (0.1043) (0.0057) (0.1043) (0.7222) (0.0851)
CFt−1 -0.439 -1.671* -1.670* -0.278
(0.4950) (0.0621) (0.0528) (0.6219)
Dt 0.158 0.146 0.132 0.268 0.137 0.268 -0.280 -0.163
(0.2608) (0.3149) (0.4766) (0.2837) (0.4673) (0.2835) (0.1284) (0.4340)
Dt−1 0.304 0.533* 0.527* 0.134
(0.1969) (0.0959) (0.0891) (0.5567)
International Competition
Exp 0.032 -0.178** -0.240*** -0.069 -0.137 -0.119 -0.072 -0.137 -0.109 0.027 -0.114** -0.147**
(0.6952) (0.0116) (0.0085) (0.4663) (0.2477) (0.4375) (0.4545) (0.2486) (0.4717) (0.5887) (0.0306) (0.0186)
Continued on next page.
17
Table 6 – Continued from previous page.
Cloglog Cloglog Cloglog Probit†
Frailty: Normal Frailty: Gamma Frailty: Mass Points Frailty: Normal
(1a) (3a) (7a) (1b) (3b) (7b) (1c) (3c) (7c) (1d) (3d) (7d)
Technological Opportunities
HTech 0.022 -0.169 -0.460* 0.068 -0.048 -0.110 0.058 -0.047 -0.112 0.050 -0.089 -0.168
(0.9024) (0.4722) (0.0895) (0.7751) (0.8853) (0.7863) (0.8143) (0.8870) (0.7787) (0.6903) (0.5909) (0.4403)
Market Power
PCM 0.562 1.757** 1.793** 0.271
(0.3643) (0.0127) (0.0135) (0.6647)
-η 0.021 0.044 -0.255* -0.410* -0.255* -0.404** 0.020 0.035
(0.8560) (0.7724) (0.0893) (0.0547) (0.0898) (0.0464) (0.8086) (0.6527)
Uncertainty
Bloom -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.002 -0.005** -0.002 -0.005** -0.004*** -0.005***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3555) (0.0233) (0.3557) (0.0248) (0.0003) (0.0000)
Time Dummies Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No
Control Variables
ln Age 0.023 -0.048 -0.063 -0.060 -0.056 -0.009 -0.062 -0.056 -0.012 -0.017 -0.064 -0.075
(0.6221) (0.4638) (0.4065) (0.3441) (0.5049) (0.9401) (0.3642) (0.5044) (0.9173) (0.6682) (0.2347) (0.1593)
ln Size -0.045 -0.013 -0.107** 0.024 -0.063 -0.186** 0.022 -0.063 -0.177** -0.029 -0.009 -0.051
(0.3164) (0.8190) (0.0324) (0.6758) (0.3649) (0.0394) (0.7049) (0.3661) (0.0380) (0.4479) (0.8259) (0.1622)
Group -0.033 0.006 -0.013 0.081 0.060 0.076 0.085 0.061 0.060 0.003 0.033 0.025
(0.7225) (0.9381) (0.8969) (0.3966) (0.6185) (0.6363) (0.3958) (0.6174) (0.7048) (0.9623) (0.5513) (0.7646)
Family -0.056 -0.091 -0.198** -0.029 -0.132 -0.070 -0.028 -0.132 -0.080 -0.060 -0.071 -0.129*
(0.4753) (0.2722) (0.0395) (0.7562) (0.2531) (0.6486) (0.7734) (0.2537) (0.5901) (0.2600) (0.1892) (0.0535)
Centre 0.036 0.095 0.239** 0.076 0.172 0.393** 0.085 0.172 0.399** 0.040 0.101 0.183**
(0.7020) (0.3570) (0.0433) (0.4862) (0.2060) (0.0284) (0.4801) (0.2066) (0.0219) (0.5768) (0.1923) (0.0113)
South 0.221** 0.253** 0.441*** 0.311*** 0.525*** 0.720*** 0.321** 0.525*** 0.709*** 0.159** 0.212*** 0.302***
(0.0440) (0.0385) (0.0002) (0.0077) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0135) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0274) (0.0010) (0.0016)
Const 0.065 0.949** 0.733* -0.743* -0.485 -1.245* -0.888 -2.371*** -7.526 0.413 0.951*** 0.789***
(0.8237) (0.0453) (0.0966) (0.0531) (0.3754) (0.0951) (0.1071) (0.0000) (0.7505) (0.1497) (0.0058) (0.0082)
L-Likelihood -2122.561 -1718.848 -1237.343 -1630.360 -1108.750 -825.080 -1630.210 -1108.750 -824.823 -2100.921 -1707.008 -1225.562
Heterogeneity ‡ No No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No
A.I.C. 4297.122 3477.696 2514.686 3312.720 2257.501 1690.159 3314.420 2257.500 1691.646 4265.841 3464.016 2501.124
B.I.C. 4462.054 3603.461 2635.430 3477.653 2383.267 1810.904 3485.696 2383.266 1818.427 4468.835 3621.223 2652.054
N 4203 3977 3094 4203 3977 3094 4203 3977 3094 4203 3977 3094
(†) The Probit model includes the mean values of all continuous variables. Coefficient are reported in Table 12. (‡) The presence of heterogeneity is tested for in Tables 9, 10, 11, 12.
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4 conclusions
This study examines the matter of innovation persistence, represented by
the length of the innovative spells firms experience, exploiting a duration
analysis framework. Our sample consists of R&D engaged Italian firms
drawn from the survey data set by the Bank of Italy within the period 2003–
2012. The availability of firm-level panel data allows for the distinction
between spurious persistence (innovation is caused by time-invariant unob-
served firm characteristics that are exogenous to the sequence of innovative
events, but determine its initial conditions) and true persistence (intertem-
poral spill overs between subsequent innovation activities).
We primarily followed the approach presented by Máñez et al. [2014],
adding some important contributions of our own by expanding the set
of variables that test for true persistence (“sunk-cost” and “success-breads-
success” effects), and testing the Proportional Hazard assumption to hold
in the Cox and Cloglog models, which allowed us to reject the Cox model
as biased. Within a discrete time framework, we estimated a Cloglog model,
for which the assumption of PH holds, once unobserved heterogeneity is
controlled for, and a random effect Probit model, that does not assume Pro-
portional Hazards.
We find that innovative behaviour is persistent: past experience is an in-
centive to remain an R&D performer. This signals the presence of important
temporal spill overs that reflect the cumulability of knowledge (“learning-
by-doing” effect). The “success-bread-success” effect is also verified, since
the negative coefficients of the variables CF and −η signal that firms that
have internal funds available and enjoy some degree of market power are
better able to sustain the expenses connected with research and develop-
ment activities. Furthermore, the presence of important sunk costs is sup-
ported by the negative and significant estimated coefficients of the Bloom
Index, a rise in which causes firms be less reactive in their decisions about in-
vestments (“caution” effect). Also, the non-significant coefficients for ∆IM
and ∆IS reveal that the continuity of R&D activity is not related to unex-
pected variations in physical and software investment, consistently with the
fact that, while such expenses incur stock adjustment costs, expenditures
connected with innovation tend to be more persistent. This evidence would
suggest that R&D spending is a path-dependent process, as confirmed by
the fact that relatively time-invariant firm characteristics are often non sig-
nificant and unobserved heterogeneity seems to play little role.
As for market power, different measures lead to different results. While
PCM’s coefficients are positive (i.e. the higher the PCM, the higher is the
probability that an innovation-engaged firm will discontinue investment);
elasticity’s coefficients are negative. We would argue that these results,
which are not conclusive, underline the importance of finding better proxies
for the measurement of market power. As pointed out by Boone [2000, 2001,
2008], Coscollá-Girona et al. [2011], one should take into account the fact
that different efficiency level imply different responses to increases in com-
petitive pressure. Even though the data did not allow us to account for firm
efficiency, we would argue that our measure of implied elasticity is better
suited to capture market power than PCM.
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4.1 Discussion.
Some questions are open to further research: first of all, more attention
should be directed to the construction of valid measures for market power,
since traditional ones (like PCM) are likely to be insufficient for describing
competitive pressure. We would argue that our measure, that accounts for
a microeconomics concept such as firm demand elasticity, may be an ap-
propriate one, provided that data about it were collected yearly, in order to
capture long-run dynamics.
Secondly, within this framework we were not able to distinguish the gen-
eral event “interruption of R&D investment” from other events, e.g. exit
from the market, or acquisition. We are stating the obvious when we argue
that exit from the innovative state and exit from the market are events driven
by different underlying processes. Furthermore, it would be interesting to
develop such an approach as in [Balcaen et al., 2012], where different types
of exit from the market are considered, in a competing-risk model approach.
It seems reasonable to think that, for instance, a firm that successfully inno-
vates but is not able to fully appropriate the returns of its effort (e.g. because
it does not have the resource to properly advertise and distribute its prod-
ucts) may be acquired by a bigger firm. In this case we would observe an
interruption in R&D investment on behalf of the acquired firm. In order to
establish the continuity of innovative effort, though, it might be desirable to
take into account that R&D activity was not discontinued, just transferred
to another firm. Such a study would make our comprehension about inno-
vation dynamics more precise, allowing to properly assess the effect of each
variable on different events.
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a appendix
Table 7: Sample vs. Working Sample: Time-Invariant Variables.
Full Sample (N=8,370) Working Sample (N=3,138)
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Geogr. Area
North-West 1,909 22.81 825 26.29
North-East 1,775 21.21 818 26.07
Centre 1,764 21.08 731 23.30
South 2,922 34.91 764 24.35
Tech. Index
High 346 4.13 156 4.97
Medium-High 1,884 22.51 865 27.57
Medium-Low 2,875 34.35 1,050 33.46
Low 3,265 39.01 1,067 34.00
Dummy Variables
Group 3,219 38.46 1,552 49.46
Exporter 4,896 58.49 1,968 62.72
Listed 99 2.76 65 3.05
SME 6,392 76.37 2,114 67.37
Family 908 10.85 647 20.62
Manufacturing 6,398 76.44 2,811 89.58
Size
20–99 5,159 61.64 1,480 47.16
100–249 1,706 20.38 837 26.67
250–500 736 8.79 402 12.81
over 500 769 9.19 419 13.35
Mean 304.16 396.63
Median 67 108
Std. Dev. 2303.51 1811.8
Age
0–1 76 0.91 12 0.38
2–5 506 6.05 111 3.54
6–10 866 10.35 259 8.25
11–30 3,856 46.07 1,292 41.17
31–50 1,983 23.69 895 28.52
Over 50 1,083 12.94 569 18.13
Mean 29.42 34.33
Median 24 29
Std. Dev. 24.09 25.98
In order to obtain descriptive statistics which are not influenced by the different number of observations
per firm, we have used the first available observation for each firm from 2003 onwards. This description is
representative of the sample due to the relatively time-invariant nature of the reported variables.
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Table 8: Robustness Checks for the Cox Model with no Frailty.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Cumulativeness
lnRDt -0.050** -0.111*** -0.109*** -0.118*** -0.109***
(0.0011) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
lnRDt−1 -0.087*** -0.097***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Spell Number -4.135*** -3.220*** -3.152*** -3.140*** -3.055*** -2.680*** -2.500***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Time -1.345*** -1.109*** -1.084*** -1.103*** -1.086*** -0.974*** -0.907***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Left Censoring
Left Cens. -0.003 0.257*** 0.121 0.252*** 0.138 0.358*** 0.146
(0.9687) (0.0005) (0.0803) (0.0010) (0.0912) (0.0009) (0.2173)
Investments
IM 0.334 1.157** 1.252** 1.388*
(0.4453) (0.0042) (0.0021) (0.0153)
∆IM 1.009 0.313 0.702
(0.2475) (0.6951) (0.4352)
IS -15.842* -19.979 -25.280** -28.969*
(0.0464) (0.0870) (0.0032) (0.0455)
∆IS -4.917 -7.261 -12.404
(0.3913) (0.2977) (0.1247)
Finances
CFt 0.361 0.286 0.670 0.588 0.953
(0.5507) (0.4145) (0.2112) (0.2125) (0.0790)
CFt−1 0.507 0.834
(0.4284) (0.2469)
Dt -0.281 -0.540** -0.407* -0.473** -0.333
(0.0531) (0.0021) (0.0315) (0.0021) (0.0802)
Dt−1 -0.087*** -0.097***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
International Competition
Exp 0.068 -0.382*** -0.175* -0.402*** -0.179* -0.491*** -0.178
(0.3615) (0.0000) (0.0216) (0.0000) (0.0190) (0.0000) (0.0887)
Technological Opportunities
HTech 0.124 -0.323* -0.200 -0.449 -0.314 -0.364 -0.357
(0.5038) (0.0424) (0.3723) (0.0748) (0.1274) (0.1960) (0.1798)
Market Power
PCM 0.712
(0.1288)
−η -0.070 -0.058 -0.019 -0.013 -0.025 -0.018
(0.4581) (0.3873) (0.8640) (0.8922) (0.8378) (0.8819)
Uncertainty
Bloom -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.020***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Time dummies Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No
Control Variables
ln Age 0.028 -0.003 0.052 0.006 0.064 -0.003 0.045
(0.4972) (0.9628) (0.3678) (0.9182) (0.2816) (0.9626) (0.5604)
ln Size 0.028 -0.022 -0.022 0.003 -0.004 -0.000 -0.001
(0.3263) (0.5800) (0.5894) (0.9425) (0.9264) (0.9932) (0.9858)
Group 0.029 0.136* 0.158* 0.142 0.168* 0.131 0.152
(0.6006) (0.0396) (0.0157) (0.0680) (0.0172) (0.1034) (0.1008)
Family 0.321*** 0.212** 0.105 0.186** 0.076 0.138 -0.006
(0.0000) (0.0028) (0.1123) (0.0068) (0.3532) (0.1385) (0.9563)
Centre 0.059 0.137 0.163 0.150 0.169 0.221* 0.238*
(0.4995) (0.1276) (0.0755) (0.0896) (0.1185) (0.0467) (0.0407)
South 0.280** 0.203* 0.335*** 0.188 0.340*** 0.315** 0.478***
(0.0020) (0.0187) (0.0002) (0.0517) (0.0001) (0.0031) (0.0000)
L-Likelihood -5435.104 -4072.731 -3998.766 -3528.991 -3458.539 -2567.472 -2498.926
A.I.C. 10904.208 8179.462 8033.532 7091.981 6953.078 5168.943 5033.852
B.I.C. 10993.827 8268.626 8127.941 7179.193 7045.420 5253.269 5123.053
N 1439 1401 1401 1249 1249 1054 1049
P-values are reported in parenthesis. All estimation were run with the Stata command stcox and
bootstrapped errors. This model does not control for unobserved heterogeneity.
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Table 9: Robustness Check for the Complementary Log-Logistic Model with
Normally-Distributed Frailty.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Cumulativeness
lnRDt -0.124*** -0.167*** -0.162*** -0.169*** -0.162***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
lnRDt−1 -0.059*** -0.050**
(0.0000) (0.0011)
Spell Number -0.001 -0.074 -0.015 -0.039 0.013 0.035 0.023
(0.9923) (0.7124) (0.8965) (0.8133) (0.9160) (0.7343) (0.8135)
Time -0.112*** -0.227*** -0.164*** -0.238*** -0.171*** -0.199*** -0.129***
(0.0011) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002)
Left Censoring
Left Cens. -0.358*** -0.212** -0.398*** -0.162 -0.355*** -0.269** -0.487***
(0.0004) (0.0292) (0.0000) (0.1027) (0.0015) (0.0377) (0.0000)
Investments
IM 0.089 1.229 1.096 1.526
(0.8500) (0.2603) (0.3099) (0.2966)
∆IM 0.490 0.106 0.303
(0.6850) (0.9149) (0.8238)
IS -25.656** -21.576 -23.304* -20.654
(0.0117) (0.1718) (0.0662) (0.1722)
∆IS -12.240 -11.885* -7.993
(0.1402) (0.0618) (0.3806)
Finances
CFt -0.809 -0.652 -0.900* -0.390 -0.653
(0.2524) (0.2507) (0.0756) (0.4801) (0.2020)
CFt−1 -0.531 -0.439
(0.4751) (0.4950)
Dt 0.158 0.055 0.146 0.085 0.176
(0.2608) (0.7898) (0.3149) (0.6736) (0.3314)
Dt−1 0.254 0.304
(0.2601) (0.1969)
International Competition
Exp 0.032 -0.163* -0.178** -0.187* -0.192** -0.217** -0.240***
(0.6952) (0.0890) (0.0116) (0.0837) (0.0206) (0.0443) (0.0085)
Technological Opportunities
HTech 0.022 -0.240 -0.169 -0.410 -0.318 -0.413 -0.460*
(0.9024) (0.4104) (0.4722) (0.2114) (0.2817) (0.2249) (0.0895)
Market Power
PCM 0.562
(0.3643)
-η 0.004 0.021 0.027 0.042 0.038 0.044
(0.9719) (0.8560) (0.8093) (0.7159) (0.8030) (0.7724)
Uncertainty
Bloom -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.007***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Time dummies Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No
Control Variables
ln Age 0.023 -0.054 -0.048 -0.050 -0.043 -0.075 -0.063
(0.6221) (0.3702) (0.4638) (0.5117) (0.5562) (0.3001) (0.4065)
ln Size -0.045 -0.008 -0.013 -0.015 -0.029 -0.087* -0.107**
(0.3164) (0.8821) (0.8190) (0.7924) (0.5945) (0.0656) (0.0324)
Group -0.033 -0.010 0.006 -0.002 0.023 -0.033 -0.013
(0.7225) (0.9093) (0.9381) (0.9851) (0.7998) (0.8094) (0.8969)
Family -0.056 -0.041 -0.091 -0.080 -0.132* -0.156 -0.198**
(0.4753) (0.6607) (0.2722) (0.3668) (0.0776) (0.1210) (0.0395)
Centre 0.036 0.141 0.095 0.188 0.136 0.269** 0.239**
(0.7020) (0.1894) (0.3570) (0.1149) (0.2362) (0.0357) (0.0433)
South 0.221** 0.294*** 0.253** 0.334*** 0.290** 0.463*** 0.441***
(0.0440) (0.0016) (0.0385) (0.0001) (0.0082) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Const 0.065 0.232 0.949** 0.237 0.967** -0.615 0.733*
(0.8237) (0.5725) (0.0453) (0.6534) (0.0382) (0.1748) (0.0966)
L-Likelihood -2122.561 -1705.980 -1718.848 -1522.887 -1535.417 -1225.291 -1237.343
ρ 0.012 0.033 0.000 0.035 0.005 0.000 0.000
σρ 0.142 0.237 0.007 0.242 0.087 0.005 0.004
A.I.C. 4297.122 3465.961 3477.696 3099.773 3110.834 2504.582 2514.686
B.I.C. 4462.054 3635.745 3603.461 3266.830 3234.580 2667.648 2635.430
N 4203 3977 3977 3595 3595 3101 3094
P-values are in parenthesis. All estimations were run with the Stata command xtcloglog and bootstrapped
errors. Parameter ρ represents the fraction of variance due to unobserved heterogeneity.
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Table 10: Robustness Checks for the Complementary Log-Logistic Model with
Gamma-Distributed Frailty.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Cumulativeness
lnRDt -0.132*** -0.186*** -0.172*** -0.214*** -0.196***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
lnRDt−1 -0.083*** -0.080***
(0.0004) (0.0001)
Spell Number 0.004 -0.116 -0.106 -0.042 -0.025 0.015 0.083
(0.9684) (0.3551) (0.3758) (0.7471) (0.8406) (0.9203) (0.5750)
Time -0.094* -0.167*** -0.041 -0.160*** -0.038 -0.103* 0.058
(0.0797) (0.0002) (0.2368) (0.0010) (0.4392) (0.0914) (0.3525)
Left Censoring
Left Cens. -0.387*** -0.333** -0.765*** -0.216 -0.628*** -0.261 -0.716***
(0.0017) (0.0372) (0.0000) (0.2134) (0.0000) (0.2135) (0.0001)
Investments
IM 0.125 1.826 1.407 1.486
(0.7391) (0.1223) (0.2177) (0.3643)
∆IM -0.198 -0.533 0.618
(0.9037) (0.7289) (0.7080)
IS -31.461** -33.054* -37.888** -37.727*
(0.0332) (0.0672) (0.0442) (0.0881)
∆IS -7.012 -8.264 -0.546
(0.5014) (0.3964) (0.9545)
Finances
CFt -2.155*** -0.853 -1.083 -0.775 -1.070
(0.0056) (0.2284) (0.1043) (0.2981) (0.1191)
CFt−1 -1.592 -1.671*
(0.1182) (0.0621)
Dt 0.132 0.162 0.268 0.128 0.244
(0.4766) (0.5358) (0.2837) (0.6487) (0.3515)
Dt−1 0.508 0.533*
(0.1269) (0.0959)
International Competition
Exp -0.069 -0.120 -0.137 -0.146 -0.145 -0.132 -0.119
(0.4663) (0.3476) (0.2477) (0.2770) (0.2395) (0.4197) (0.4375)
Technological Opportunities
HTech 0.068 -0.230 -0.048 -0.225 -0.034 -0.132 -0.110
(0.7751) (0.5082) (0.8853) (0.5280) (0.9189) (0.7567) (0.7863)
Market Power
PCM 1.757**
(0.0127)
-η -0.302* -0.255* -0.261 -0.230 -0.421* -0.410*
(0.0616) (0.0893) (0.1344) (0.1499) (0.0581) (0.0547)
Uncertainty
Bloom -0.002 -0.003 -0.005**
(0.3555) (0.1974) (0.0233)
Time Dummies Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No
Control Variables
ln Age -0.060 -0.071 -0.056 -0.024 -0.009 -0.032 -0.009
(0.3441) (0.4408) (0.5049) (0.8084) (0.9161) (0.8029) (0.9401)
ln Size 0.024 -0.047 -0.063 -0.058 -0.081 -0.148 -0.186**
(0.6758) (0.5351) (0.3649) (0.4844) (0.2959) (0.1187) (0.0394)
Group 0.081 0.025 0.060 0.065 0.108 0.037 0.076
(0.3966) (0.8453) (0.6185) (0.6378) (0.3955) (0.8262) (0.6363)
Family -0.029 -0.042 -0.132 -0.018 -0.108 0.014 -0.070
(0.7562) (0.7366) (0.2531) (0.8908) (0.3704) (0.9299) (0.6486)
Centre 0.076 0.260* 0.172 0.232 0.149 0.447** 0.393**
(0.4862) (0.0705) (0.2060) (0.1299) (0.2925) (0.0170) (0.0284)
South 0.311*** 0.626*** 0.525*** 0.585*** 0.480*** 0.781*** 0.720***
(0.0077) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0015) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Const. -0.743* -1.119* -0.485 -1.055 -0.478 -2.482*** -1.245*
(0.0531) (0.0708) (0.3754) (0.1240) (0.4145) (0.0031) (0.0951)
L-Likelihood -1630.360 -1072.294 -1108.750 -997.259 -1027.384 -800.257 -825.080
χ2 Test 984.419 1267.457 1220.194 1051.383 1016.068 850.069 824.526
P-value(u) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
A.I.C. 3312.720 2198.587 2257.501 2048.518 2094.768 1654.513 1690.159
B.I.C. 3477.653 2368.371 2383.267 2215.575 2218.514 1817.579 1810.904
N 4203 3977 3977 3595 3595 3101 3094
P-values are in parenthesis. All estimations were run with the Stata command pgmhaz8. The reported χ2
test checks for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity.
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Table 11: Robustness Check for the Complementary Log-Logistic Model with
Mass-Points Frailty.
(1) (1a) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7)
Cumulativeness
lnRDt -0.135*** -0.136*** -0.172 -0.172*** -0.200***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (.) (0.0000) (0.0000)
lnRDt−1 -0.076*** -0.079***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Spell Number 0.012 0.013 0.056 -0.106 -0.019 0.038 0.067
(0.9151) (0.9062) (.) (0.3766) (0.8815) (.) (0.6391)
Time -0.083 -0.084 0.029*** -0.041 -0.029 -0.010 0.046
(0.2060) (0.1292) (0.0000) (0.2594) (0.4672) (0.8388) (0.3606)
Left Censoring
Left Cens -0.394*** -0.388*** -0.611*** -0.766*** -0.641*** -0.349* -0.717***
(0.0049) (0.0020) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0800) (0.0001)
Investments
IM 0.137 0.146 -0.115 1.411 1.783
(0.7111) (0.6963) (0.9831) (0.2170) (0.7094)
∆IM -0.471 0.735
(0.7594) (0.6440)
IS -33.147** -33.594** -21.460 -38.422** -24.651
(0.0309) (0.0314) (.) (0.0427) (0.3051)
∆IS -7.768 -0.801
(0.4296) (0.9318)
Finances
CFt -2.193*** -2.188*** -1.376 -1.084 -1.053
(0.0057) (0.0058) (.) (0.1043) (0.1260)
CFt−1 -1.993 -1.670*
(0.1309) (0.0528)
Dt 0.137 0.143 -0.552 0.268 0.251
(0.4673) (0.4536) (.) (0.2835) (0.3439)
Dt−1 0.495 0.527*
(.) (0.0891)
International Competition
Exp -0.072 -0.072 -0.209 -0.137 -0.143 -0.221 -0.109
(0.4545) (0.4539) (.) (0.2486) (0.2514) (0.2325) (0.4717)
Technological Opportunities
HTech 0.058 0.063 -0.261 -0.047 -0.034 -0.403 -0.112
(0.8143) (0.7969) (0.5798) (0.8870) (0.9198) (0.4946) (0.7787)
Market Power
PCM 1.793* 1.786*
(0.0135) (0.0132)
-η -0.515 -0.255* -0.229 -0.492 -0.404**
(.) (0.0898) (0.1590) (.) (0.0464)
Uncertainty
Bloom -0.002 -0.002 -0.005**
(0.3557) (0.2145) (0.0248)
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No
Control Variables
ln Age -0.062 -0.059 -0.082 -0.056 -0.012 -0.028 -0.012
(0.3642) (0.3647) (.) (0.5044) (0.8937) (0.3210) (0.9173)
ln Size 0.022 0.021 -0.559 -0.063 -0.090 -0.166 -0.177**
(0.7049) (0.7178) (.) (0.3661) (0.2441) (.) (0.0380)
Group 0.085 0.083 0.398 0.061 0.116 0.088 0.060
(0.3958) (0.3942) (.) (0.6174) (0.3744) (0.5961) (0.7048)
Family -0.028 -0.026 0.174 -0.132 -0.120 0.014 -0.080
(0.7734) (0.7927) (.) (0.2537) (0.3338) (0.9456) (0.5901)
Centre 0.085 0.090 -0.564** 0.172 0.148 0.586*** 0.399**
(0.4801) (0.4243) (0.0171) (0.2066) (0.3006) (0.0018) (0.0219)
South 0.321** 0.315*** 0.821 0.525*** 0.496*** 0.951 0.709***
(0.0135) (0.0082) (.) (0.0002) (0.0010) (.) (0.0001)
Const. -0.888 -0.716 -1.743 -2.371*** -7.089 -3.686 -7.526
(0.1071) (0.3561) (.) (0.0000) (0.8682) (.) (0.7505)
L-Likelihood -1630.210 -1630.184 -1099.506 -1108.750 -1027.215 -798.423 -824.823
m2 1.660 2.555 4.240 1.890 6.726 3.091 6.458
P-value (m2) (0.7062) (0.2568) (.) (.) (0.8749) (.) (0.7848)
A.I.C. 3314.420 3316.368 2223.012 2257.500 2096.430 1636.846 1691.646
B.I.C. 3485.696 3493.987 2298.471 2383.266 2226.363 1757.636 1818.427
N 4203 4203 3977 3977 3595 3101 3094
P-values are in parenthesis. All estimations were run with the Stata command hshaz. m2 represents the
second mass points. If m2 is significant, there is unobserved heterogeneity. Column (1a) reports estimates
for the assumption of three mass points: m3 is non-significant (p-value is 0.8252), and estimates are
consistent with the two-mass-points specification. Model (4) is not reported because of convergence
problems.
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Table 12: Robustness Checks for the Random Effects Probit Model with
Normally-Distributed Frailty.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Cumulativeness
lnRDt -0.037** -0.089*** -0.079*** -0.081*** -0.074***
(0.0198) (0.0000) (0.0011) (0.0001) (0.0001)
lnRDt−1 -0.026** -0.017
(0.0246) (0.1489)
Spell Number -0.106 -0.226 -0.096 -0.148 -0.076 -0.011 -0.015
(0.3580) (0.1946) (0.4450) (0.1970) (0.4733) (0.8820) (0.8483)
Time -0.050* -0.117*** -0.079*** -0.132*** -0.082*** -0.122*** -0.067***
(0.0977) (0.0001) (0.0026) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0012)
Left Censoring
Left Cens. -0.267*** -0.171*** -0.294*** -0.147** -0.278*** -0.167** -0.319***
(0.0001) (0.0067) (0.0001) (0.0143) (0.0000) (0.0302) (0.0001)
Investments
IM 0.225 0.437 0.346 1.014
(0.5353) (0.6812) (0.6961) (0.2664)
∆IM 0.469 0.138 0.091
(0.5150) (0.8044) (0.8803)
IS -16.407** -9.407 -8.892 -10.020
(0.0363) (0.1745) (0.2883) (0.2648)
∆IS -11.369* -11.332* -13.590**
(0.0853) (0.0663) (0.0337)
Finances
CFt -0.202 -0.364 -0.592 -0.295 -0.521
(0.7222) (0.4519) (0.0851) (0.4736) (0.3647)
CFt−1 -0.284 -0.278
(0.6206) (0.6219)
Dt -0.280 -0.312 -0.163 -0.383* -0.231
(0.1284) (0.1844) (0.4340) (0.0908) (0.4213)
Dt−1 0.117 0.134
(0.6916) (0.5567)
International Competition
Exp 0.027 -0.111* -0.114** -0.122* -0.120* -0.144* -0.147**
(0.5887) (0.0924) (0.0306) (0.0852) (0.0655) (0.0683) (0.0186)
Technological Opportunities
HTech 0.050 -0.149 -0.089 -0.194 -0.106 -0.228 -0.168
(0.6903) (0.4403) (0.5909) (0.3555) (0.6157) (0.1805) (0.4403)
Market Power
PCM 0.271
(0.6647)
-η 0.013 0.020 0.034 0.036 0.027 0.035
(0.8681) (0.8086) (0.6884) (0.6591) (0.7359) (0.6527)
Uncertainty
Bloom -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005***
(0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Time Dummies Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No
Control Variables
ln Age -0.017 -0.073 -0.064 -0.071 -0.067 -0.080 -0.075
(0.6682) (0.1379) (0.2347) (0.1568) (0.1788) (0.1025) (0.1593)
ln Size -0.029 -0.001 -0.009 -0.008 -0.020 -0.036 -0.051
(0.4479) (0.9865) (0.8259) (0.8593) (0.5869) (0.2182) (0.1622)
Group 0.003 0.026 0.033 0.040 0.050 0.012 0.025
(0.9623) (0.6748) (0.5513) (0.6085) (0.3931) (0.8202) (0.7646)
Family -0.060 -0.042 -0.071 -0.067 -0.099** -0.097 -0.129*
(0.2600) (0.5202) (0.1892) (0.3295) (0.0381) (0.1262) (0.0535)
Centre 0.040 0.114 0.101 0.134* 0.119 0.189** 0.183**
(0.5768) (0.1971) (0.1923) (0.0738) (0.1328) (0.0265) (0.0113)
South 0.159** 0.231*** 0.212*** 0.240*** 0.227*** 0.307*** 0.302***
(0.0274) (0.0030) (0.0010) (0.0048) (0.0038) (0.0000) (0.0016)
Mean of Continuous Explanatory Variables†
lnRDt -0.078*** -0.052*** -0.048*** -0.054*** -0.052*** -0.044*** -0.048***
(0.0000) (0.0006) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0036) (0.0032)
Dt 0.645** 0.619** 0.454* 0.765** 0.610** 0.140 0.164
(0.0145) (0.0306) (0.0638) (0.0121) (0.0498) (0.6862) (0.5979)
Const. 0.413 0.568* 0.951*** 0.510 0.954*** -0.123 0.789***
(0.1497) (0.0952) (0.0058) (0.1484) (0.0020) (0.7021) (0.0082)
L-Likelihood -2100.921 -1693.954 -1707.008 -1508.222 -1520.811 -1216.427 -1225.562
ρ 0.067 0.119 0.034 0.082 0.036 0.000 0.000
σρ 0.267 0.367 0.189 0.298 0.194 0.002 0.002
A.I.C. 4265.841 3451.908 3464.016 3080.445 3091.621 2496.854 2501.124
B.I.C. 4468.835 3653.133 3621.223 3278.438 3246.304 2690.118 2652.054
N 4203 3977 3977 3595 3595 3101 3094
P-values are in parenthesis. All estimations were run with the Stata command xtprobit. Parameter ρ
represents the fraction of variance due to unobserved heterogeneity.
(†) We only report significant means.
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